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1: Introduction 
  While the age of gunboat diplomacy as a mechanism of credit enforcement has long 
passed, sovereign default is still an exceptional event.  This stylized fact indicates that while the 
source of a sovereign default penalty is still controversial, sovereigns behave as if they consider 
default costly.  Many models of sovereign debt in the literature [e.g. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), 
(1989b)] introduce explicit default penalties to rationalize this fact.  These sanctions are 
primarily considered to be methods of inhibiting trade. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) discuss the 
difficulties countries would experience in their trade subsequent to default, including 
complications associated with avoiding seizure and the interruption of short-term trade credit. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why one might doubt the existence of default 
penalties.  Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) themselves admit that it is unclear whether private 
creditors enjoy the ability to induce their governments to enforce claims on sovereign borrowers.  
Kletzer and Wright (2000) argue that most penalties in models of sovereign lending are not 
“renegotiation-proof.”  That is, Kletzer and Wright argue that both parties could do better 
subsequent to a full or partial sovereign default, if the creditor resists levying a destructive 
penalty from which (s)he would receive no immediate benefit.  In brief, there is considerable 
uncertainty concerning the viability of penalties for sovereign default.  Thus, empirical evidence 
regarding such penalties warrants attention.   
Unfortunately, there are only a limited number of empirical studies concerning such 
penalties.  Ozler (1993) provides evidence of positive, albeit small, premia charged to countries 
with default histories.  Cline (1987) notes that Bolivia and Peru experienced interruptions in their 
flows of short-term trade credits subsequent to debt renegotiation.  In a recent paper, Rose (2002) 
provides empirical support for the role of trade as a sovereign enforcement mechanism.  His   2
paper shows that sovereign Paris Club reschedulings are followed by economically and 
statistically significant reductions in international trade.   
The evidence of Cline and Rose centers on the interruption of international trade as a 
mechanism for sovereign debt repayment.  If one believes that the primary penalties for 
enforcing sovereign debt obligations are trade related, then creditors originating from nations 
with strong bilateral trade ties with a debtor nation should have a comparative advantage in 
lending to that nation.   
  In this short paper, we explore this idea.  We first present a theoretical model of 
international lending where a debtor optimally chooses its borrowing from different creditors. 
These creditors are identical except that they are located in countries which differ by the strength 
of their bilateral trade ties with the debtor.  We show that in equilibrium, the pattern of 
borrowing favors the creditor with higher bilateral trade volume with the debtor.  We then test 
and corroborate this idea using an annual panel data set including bilateral trade and international 
banking claims from 20 creditor and 149 debtor countries from 1986 through 1999. Using 
instrumental variable (and other) techniques, we find a significantly positive effect of bilateral 
trade on bilateral lending patterns. That is, debtors tend to borrow more from creditors with 
whom they share more international trade ties. 
Our theoretical model is presented in next section. We then present the data set and 
methodology and test the model. The paper ends with a brief summary. 
 
2:  A Model of Sovereign Borrowing with Trade-Related Default Penalties   3
In this section we develop a simple borrowing model in which a sovereign debtor 
allocates its borrowing across different creditor nations, when default penalties are based on 
proportional losses in bilateral gains from trade. 
We assume that there are three countries: one borrower country, i, and two creditor 
countries, a and b.  Let r represent one plus the world risk-free interest rate. All countries are 
assumed to be small and therefore take r as given.  Lending banks in the creditor countries are 
risk-neutral and therefore willing to extend unlimited funds at levels consistent with an expected 
return equal to r.  
The model has two periods. In the first period, the representative agent in lender country j 
(j=a,b) extends a loan of magnitude  ij L  in return for the promise of a fixed payment  ij D  in the 
second period. In the second period, the agent in debtor country i makes its default decisions.  If 
the debtor chooses to service its country j debt it pays ij D . If the debtor defaults, it suffers a 
penalty equal to a fraction θ  of its gains from bilateral trade with country j, where 01 . θ <<  
Bilateral gains from trade are exogenous and equal to  ij T γ , where γ is a positive constant 
and  ij T  is a random variable reflecting total trade between country i and country j in the second 
period. Expectations of  ij T are unbiased and satisfy  
  () 1 ij ij i TE Tε =+  (1) 
where  () 1 ij ET represents the period one expected value of  ij T  and  i ε  is an i.i.d. disturbance term 
with expected value 0 and a symmetric and single-peaked-distribution on the interval 
,. i εε ε  ∈   Let  () F ε  represent the distribution of  , ε i.e. the probability that   , i εε ≤ and   4
() f ε  represent its density. The creditor nations are assumed to only differ in their expected 
trade volume with the debtor country, with  () () 11 ia ib ET ET > . 
  The expected utility function of the representative agent in country i satisfies 
  () () ( ) 11 1 2 ii i EU UC EC β =+  (2) 
where  '0 , U >  "0 , U <   it C  represents consumption in country i in period t () 1, 2 t = , and β  
represents the debtor’s discount rate. The specification that debtor utility is linear in expected 
second period consumption is made for analytic simplicity, but drives none of our results. 
 Debtor  income,  it Y , is exogenous in both periods. Debtor first-period consumption 
satisfies 
  11 . i i ia ib CYLL =++  (3) 
  Since no new funds are obtained in period 2, the debtor’s default decision on debts from 
each creditor nation is based on maximizing expected second period consumption.  Conditional 
on service on its debt obligations to country j, debtor second-period consumption satisfies 
  () 22 , i i ij ij ik i CY T D g D γ ε =+ −−  (4) 
where  j k ≠  and  () , ik i gD ε  represents the cost of the debtor’s utility-maximizing default 
decision on debt owed to country k.  
  Similarly, conditional on default on obligations to country j, debtor second-period  
consumption satisfies 
  () ( ) 22 1, . ii i j i k i CY T g D θ γ ε =+ − −  (5) 
If follows that the debtor chooses to default on country j when  ij ij D T θ γ > .    5
Define 
*
ij ε  as the realization of  i ε  that leaves the debtor indifferent between default and 
repayment. 
*









=−  (6) 
Equilibrium in the model is defined as the pair of debt obligations () , ia ib DD that 
maximize expected debtor utility subject to both creditors’ zero profit conditions. The creditors’ 













Utility maximization for the debtor can be characterized in terms of two decisions, the 
overall borrowing level,  i L , and the allocation of debt across the two creditors,  ia D  and  ib D . 
Consider first the allocation decision. Given total borrowing i L , maximizing expected utility 
subject to the creditors’ zero-profit conditions yields the first-order condition 
 
** . ia ib εε =  (8) 
Equation (8) suggests that the debtor maximizes expected utility by allocating its 
borrowing to equalize the probability of default across the two creditor nations. The intuition 
behind this result lies in the creditors’ zero-profit conditions. Since the creditors’ risk premia are 
symmetric functions of default risk, equalizing the marginal cost of the last dollar borrowed in 
each country implies equalizing the probability of default across the two countries.  















Equation (9) yields our first result: Holding total lending constant, the share of lending 
originating in country a is increasing in the expected volume of trade with country a.  
Note that the result in equation (9) also implies that default decisions are identical ex-
post. Consequently, let 
*
i ε  represent the realization of  i ε  that leaves the debtor indifferent 
between default and debt service to both creditors. By equations (7) and (8) we obtain 












 =− +  

 (10) 
We can now confront the debtor’s overall borrowing decision. Maximizing expected 
utility over the choice of  i D  subject to the creditors’ zero-profit conditions and the debtor’s 
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* f  and 
* F  represent  ()
*
i f ε  and  ()
*
i F ε  respectively.  Note that the first bracketed term 
will be positive when more borrowing would be desired if there were no default risk, a condition 
we assume to hold. 





























 (12)   7
where the denominator can be signed as negative by the debtor’s second order condition. 
  The term in the numerator can be signed as positive when the utility function is not too 
concave.

















Given satisfaction of this condition, equation (12) shows that holding all else equal, an 
increase in  () 1 ia ET  increases the total level of borrowing by the debtor. 
Our results demonstrate that an increase in the expected volume of bilateral trade with an 
individual country is associated with both an increase in overall borrowing and an increase in the 
share of overall borrowing originating in that country. Consequently, the model predicts a 
positive correlation between expected bilateral trade volumes and bilateral lending. In the next 
section, we test this prediction. 
 
3:  Empirics 
Gravity Methodology 
  We are interested in estimating the effect of international trade on international debt. 
However, international borrowing may itself encourage trade; alternatively, both borrowing and 
trade may be jointly driven by common factors. That is, it is important for us to consider the 
possibility that international borrowing and trade are simultaneously determined. 
We solve this problem using instrumental variables.  The popular “gravity” model of 
bilateral international trade provides a wealth of potential instrumental variables. Many variables 
which are known to be important determinants of international trade are unlikely to be important   8
determinants of international lending patterns.  For instance, a pair of landlocked countries 
engages in less international trade, while a pair of physically large countries or those which share 
a common land border trade more.  But international lending patterns are unlikely to be affected 
by such features.  We use such variables as instrumental variables for trade in a model of 
bilateral lending.  
Since conditions that lead two countries to be more integrated are likely to lead to more 
financial activity between them, our specification for bilateral international borrowing levels 
follows the gravity model of international trade closely: 
 
ln(Cijt) = β 1ln(YiYj)t + β 2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β 3lnDij + β 4Langij + β 5Contij + β 6FTAijt  
+ β 7Landlij + β 8Islandij +β 9ln(AreaiAreaj) + β 10ComColij + β 11CurColijt    (14) 
+ β 12Colonyij + β 13ComNatij + β14CUijt + γ τ ⋅ Tτ t + ϕ ln(Xijt) + ε ijt 
 
where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
 
•  Cijt denotes the value of real lending from i to j at time t, 
•  Xijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, 
•  Y is real GDP, 
•  Pop is population, 
•  D is the distance between i and j, 
•  Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, 
•  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, 
•  FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, 
•  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2). 
•  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Area is the land mass of the country,   9
•  ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer, 
•  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, 
•  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
•  ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during 
the sample (e.g., the UK and Bermuda), 
•  CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
•  Tτ t is a comprehensive set of year-specific intercepts, 
• β  and γ  are vectors of nuisance coefficients, and 
• ε ij represents the myriad other influences on bilateral credit, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
The coefficient of interest to us is ϕ , the effect of bilateral trade between countries i and j on 
commercial bank claims by creditor country j on debtor nation i. 
We estimate the model with a number of techniques below. We begin by using ordinary least 
squares with standard errors that are robust to clustering (since pairs of countries are likely to be 
highly dependent across years).  We then use instrumental variables, dropping some of the 
regressors from the right-hand side of the equation and using them as instrumental variables.  
Finally, we employ fixed- and random-effects panel data estimators, with and without 
instrumental variables. We use both fixed and random effects estimators extensively below. 
 
The Data Set 
We use a subset of the panel data set of Glick and Rose (2002); the interested reader is 
referred to Glick and Rose for more details. 
For the regressand we use consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks on individual 
countries.  These bank loans are provided by the BIS in millions of American dollars for twenty 
creditor countries and almost 150 borrowing countries.
2  Not all of the areas covered are   10
countries in the conventional sense of the word; we use the term “country” simply for 
convenience.  (The creditor countries and debtor countries are listed in the appendix.)  The data 
are provided semi-annually from 1986; we average the data to annual series by simple averaging.  
We convert nominal bank claims to a real series by deflating by the American CPI (1982-
1984=1).  Almost half the claims are reported to be zero.  This makes the log transformation 
potentially important and questionable; we investigate it further below. 
The most important regressor is the level of international trade.  We use bilateral trade 
flows taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade data set, deflated by the American CPI.
3  To this 
we add population and real GDP data (in constant dollars).
4  We exploit the CIA’s “World 
Factbook” for a number of country-specific variables. These include: latitude and longitude, land 
area, landlocked and island status, physically contiguous neighbors, language, colonizers, and 
dates of independence. We use these to create great-circle distance and our other controls. We 
obtain data from the World Trade Organization to create an indicator of regional trade 
agreements, and include: EEC/EC/EU; US-Israel FTA; NAFTA; CACM; CARICOM; 
PATCRA; ANZCERTA; ASEAN, SPARTECA, and Mercosur.  Finally, we add the Glick and 
Rose (2002) currency union dummy variable. 
Descriptive statistics for the data set are tabulated in the appendix. 
 
Results 
We begin our investigation by estimating (14) with OLS.  Our results appear in Table 1. 
Our default estimates include the entire set of regressors (i.e., all fourteen coefficients are 
estimated as well as the set of time-specific intercepts).  In this specification, the estimate of the 
all-important ϕ  coefficient is .54, with a robust standard error of .04.  This result is not only   11
consistent with our theory, but is highly significant.  With a t-statistic of over 15, the coefficient 
is different from zero at any reasonable level of statistical significance.  The effect is also 
economically significant; an increase in trade of 1% is associated with an increase in bilateral 
lending of over .5%, all other things being equal. 
The rest of the table provides a series of robustness checks.  For instance, the second row 
reports ϕ  if the other controls are dropped from the equation (i.e., we set β =γ =0); in this case, the 
effect is even more significant.  Since many of the creditor countries have not extended loans to 
some of the debtor countries, many observations of the dependent variable are zero and are thus 
dropped from the equation estimated in natural logarithms.  Therefore, the third and fourth rows 
of the table report comparable estimates of ϕ  when both trade and bank claims are included in 
untransformed levels.  Yet ϕ  remains statistically significant when the key relationship is 
estimated in levels.
5 
The fifth and sixth rows of the table move away from panel data analysis to cover only 
cross-sections for two years in the middle of the sample, 1990 and 1995.  However, the results 
are essentially unchanged from the default specification.  The seventh and final row includes 
only observations between industrial countries (i.e., those with IFS country codes less than 200).  
Again, the results are essentially unchanged. 
To summarize, the effect of international trade on bank claims seems positive, 
significant, and robust in simple OLS estimation.  The question is whether this result stands up to 
greater econometric scrutiny.  
 
IV Results   12
  We now proceed to instrumental variables estimation.  We use five instrumental variables 
for (the log of) trade: (the log of) distance between the countries; the land border dummy; the 
number of landlocked countries; the number of island nations; and the log of the product of the 
countries’ area.  We accordingly set the appropriate β  coefficients to zero (i.e., drop them from 
the equation, leaving the remaining variables as controls).  The estimates are tabulated in Table 
2a. 
  Despite the use of instrumental variables that are both plausibly exogenous and correlated 
with trade, the key results do not change with IV estimation.  The default estimate is somewhat 
smaller, averaging perhaps .4.  But it remains economically and statistically significant; it is also 
robust to a number of econometric perturbations. 
  Table 2b reports sensitivity analysis with respect to the set of instrumental variables.  
Instead of the five geographic variables, we use three whose coefficients are usually insignificant 
in OLS estimates of equation (14): the common language dummy; the regional trade agreement 
dummy; and the same nation dummy.  Again, the estimates of ϕ  seem economically and 
statistically significant.
6 
  The middle column of Table 3 adds a control for the (log of the) total credit extended by 
the creditor country, as suggested by our theoretical analysis; the right-hand column controls for 
the (log of) total debt incurred by the debtor country.  Again, the results remain economically 
and statistically significant. 
Finally, Table 4 reports results when panel estimators are used instead of more traditional 
regressions.  The middle columns report OLS fixed- and random-effects estimates of ϕ  for a 
variety of different specifications.  The right-hand column reports instrumental variables 
estimates using a random effects estimator (the fixed-effect estimator is infeasible since the   13
geographic variables are time-invariant).  Yet despite all the econometric firepower, the estimate 
of ϕ  remains significant; it has a t-statistic of almost 9 and an economically large effect.
7 
We conclude that our hypothesis that bank credit is extended across international borders 
along the lines of international trade is corroborated. 
 
4:  Summary 
It is plausible to believe that countries service their foreign debts at least in part to avoid 
the reduced trade that typically follows international default.  If so, sovereign borrowers will 
enjoy superior credit terms from creditor countries for which this penalty is disproportionately 
high.  In this paper we have provided a simple theoretical model which formalizes this intuition.  
We have also empirically investigated and confirmed the hypothesis that international trade 
patterns determine lending patterns. 
It is important to note that while our theoretical model was based on an explicit default 
penalty, our empirical evidence does not necessarily refute pure “reputation-based” models of 
sovereign debt.  For example, in a recent paper Eaton and Kletzer (2002) demonstrate that purely 
reputation-based sovereign lending arrangements are sustainable based upon the ability of one 
nation to smooth the consumption bundle of the other over time.  Since bilateral trade volume 
levels may reflect inter-temporal gains from trade, our results are likely consistent with their 
model. 
In future work it would be interesting to extend this analysis to other forms of 
international lending, above and beyond bank loans.  We think this is a good place to pass the 
torch to others.  14
Table 1: OLS Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims 
  ϕ  
Default .54  (.04) 
Without controls  .75 (.02) 
Levels .0001  (.00003) 
Levels without controls  .0001 (.00003) 
1990 .51  (.05) 
1995 .53  (.07) 
Only industrial debtors  .74 (.04) 
Equation estimated is Claimsi,j,t = ϕ Tradei,j,t + β Xi,j,t + ε i,j,t 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.  
Intercepts and year effects not recorded. 
 
 
Table 2a: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Geographic Instruments 
  ϕ  
Default .41  (.07) 
Without controls  .50 (.04) 
Levels .00006  (.00001) 
Levels without controls  .00007 (.00002) 
1990 .52  (.10) 
1995 .40  (.10) 
Only industrial debtors  1.03 (.07) 
Equation estimated is Claimsi,j,t = ϕ Tradei,j,t + β Wi,j,t + ε i,j,t 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.  
Intercepts and year effects not recorded. 
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area. 
 
 
Table 2b: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Excludable Instruments 
  ϕ  
Default .80  (.40) 
Without controls  .83 (.07) 
Levels .00004  (.00001) 
Levels without controls  .00005 (.00001) 
1990 .59  (.37) 
1995 1.13  (.49) 
Only industrial debtors  .79 (.29) 
Equation estimated is Claimsi,j,t = ϕ Tradei,j,t + β Zi,j,t + ε i,j,t 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.  
Intercepts and year effects not recorded. 
Instrumental variables for trade are: common language; regional trade agreement; same nation.  15
Table 3: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Controlling for Total Claims/Debt 
Control:  Total Claims  Total Debt 
Default  .40 (.07)  .42 (.07) 
Without controls  .42 (.04)  .27 (.04) 
Levels  .00005 (.000004)  .00006 (.00002) 
Levels without controls  .00005 (.000006)  .00006 (.00002) 
1990  .47 (.10)  .56 (.09) 
1995  .37 (.10)  .42 (.10) 
Only industrial debtors  .48 (.23)  1.10 (.20) 
OLS  .29 (.03)  .39 (.02) 
Equation estimated is Claimsi,j,t = ϕ Tradei,j,t + β Wi,j,t + ε i,j,t 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.  
Intercepts and year effects not recorded. 
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area. 
 
 
Table 4: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade Level on Claims, Panel Estimators 
Estimator:  OLS, RE  OLS, FE  IV, RE 
Default  .31 (.01)  .19 (.02)  .52 (.06) 
Without controls  .38 (.01)  .19 (.01)  .52 (.03) 
Levels  .00003 (.000001)  .00002 (.000001)  .00006 (.00001) 
Levels without controls  .00003 (.000001)  .00002 (.000001)  .00007 (.000003) 
Only industrial debtors  .46 (.06)  .28 (.07)  .96 (.19) 
Equation estimated is Claimsi,j,t = ϕ Tradei,j,t + β Wi,j,t + ε i,j,t 
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.  
Intercepts and year effects not recorded. 
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area.   16
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
 Claims 31,787 561.  3529.  0  146061. 
Log real claims 19,769 3.69  2.53  -1.20  11.5 
Log real trade 28.809 11.6  2.81  -.55  20.3 
 Controls: Log distance 28,809  8.32 .59 5.37  9.41 
Log real GDP 25,126  49.6 2.50 42.3 58.0 
Log real GDP per capita 25,102  17.3 1.07 14.1 21.1 
Common land border 28.809 .003  .053  0  1 
Common language 28,809 .173  .379  0  1 
Log areas 28,809  23.8  3.25 12.20 32.3 
# landlocked 28,809 .286  .496  0  2 
# islands 28,809 .301  .489  0  2 
Regional Trade Agreement 31,787 .009  .094  0  1 
Same nation 28,809 .003  .054  0  1 
Colonial history 28,809 .051  .221  0  1 
Current Colony 28,809 ,003  ,057  0  1 
Currency Union 28,809 .003  .055  0  1 
 
 
Appendix 2: Creditor Countries with Claims Reported 
US UK  Austria  Belgium 
Denmark France  Germany  Italy 
Netherlands Switzerland Sweden  Canada 
Japan Finland  Greece  Iceland 
Ireland Malta  Portugal  Spain 
   18
Appendix 3: Debtor Countries with Claims Reported 
 Afghanistan    Ghana    Nigeria  
 Albania    Gibraltar    Oman  
 Algeria    Greece    Pakistan  
 Angola    Grenada    Panama  
 Argentina    Guatemala    Papua New Guinea  
 Australia    Guinea    Paraguay  
 Bahamas    Guinea Bissau    Peru  
 Bahrain    Guyana    Philippines  
 Bangladesh    Haiti    Poland  
 Barbados    Honduras    Portugal  
 Belize    Hong Kong    Qatar  
 Benin    Hungary    Romania  
 Bermuda    Iceland    Rwanda  
 Bhutan    India    Sao Tome and Principe  
 Bolivia    Indonesia    Saudi Arabia  
 Botswana    Iran    Senegal  
 Brazil    Iraq    Seychelles  
 Brunei    Israel    Sierra Leone  
 Bulgaria    Jamaica    Singapore  
 Burkina Faso    Jordan    Solomon Islands  
 Burundi    Kenya    Somalia  
 Cambodia    Kiribati    South Africa  
 Cameroon    Kuwait    South Korea  
 Cape Verde    Laos    Sri Lanka  
 Cayman Islands    Lebanon    St Lucia  
 Central African Rep.    Lesotho    St Vincent  
 Chad    Liberia    St Helena  
 Chile    Libya    Sudan  
 China    Macau    Surinam  
 Colombia    Madagascar    Swaziland  
 Comoros Islands    Malawi    Syria  
 Congo    Malaysia    Tanzania  
 Congo Democratic Republic    Maldives    Thailand  
 Costa Rica    Mali    Togo  
 Cote d'Ivoire    Malta    Tonga  
 Cuba    Mauritania    Trinidad and Tobago  
 Cyprus    Mauritius    Tunisia  
 Djibouti    Mexico    Turkey  
 Dominica    Mongolia    Uganda  
 Dominican Republic    Morocco    United Arab Emirates  
 Ecuador    Mozambique    Uruguay  
 Egypt    Myanmar    Vanuatu  
 El Salvador    Namibia    Venezuela  
 Equatorial Guinea    Nauru    Vietnam  
 Ethiopia    Nepal    Western Samoa  
 Falkland Islands    Netherlands Antilles    Yemen  
 Fiji    New Caledonia    Yugoslavia  
 French Polynesia    New Zealand    Zambia  
 Gabon    Nicaragua    Zimbabwe  
 Gambia    Niger      19
Endnotes 
 
1  In addition, we assume that the probability of default by the debtor is less than one-half, so that 
*'0 . f ≥  
2  These data are available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/qcsv0206/hanx9b.csv and are part of the International 
Banking Statistics published regularly in the BIS Quarterly Review.  For technical reasons we usually ignore a few 
observations from Ireland and Spain; adding these makes little difference in general to our results. 
3  Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in American dollars; we deflate trade by the American 
CPI. We create an average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries by averaging all of the four possible 
measures potentially available. 
4  Wherever possible, we use “World Development Indicators” (taken from the World Bank’s WDI 2000 CD-ROM) 
data. When the data are unavailable from the World Bank, we fill in missing observations with comparables from 
the Penn World Table Mark 5.6, and (when all else fails), from the IMF’s “International Financial Statistics”. The 
series have been checked and corrected for errors. 
5  Box-Cox tests imply that the natural logarithmic transformation is quite reasonable, and that the level 
transformation is rejected in favor of the log transform. 
6  If we use lags (e.g., of the GDP terms) as instrumental variables, our key result of a positive effect of trade on 
borrowing is not changed. 
7  Lending may be motivated by servicing FDI, rather than the sovereign risk issues considered in the theory above.  
To test this, we add a control in the form of the natural logarithm of FDI sourced from the creditor country.  We 
obtained the bilateral FDI data from the OECD's International Direct Investments Yearbook 1980-2000.  This data 
set is annual and unavailable for many countries in our sample, containing only some 2,600 observations.   When we 
add this control to our default IV regression (in logs, with controls)  its coefficient is indeed positive and significant.  
Still, the log of trade retains an economically and statistically significant coefficient of .62 (with a robust standard 
error of .11). 